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ROY DYCKHOFF AND SARA NEGRI
Abstract. That every first-order theory has a coherent conservative extension is regarded by some as
obvious, even trivial, and by others as not at all obvious, but instead remarkable and valuable; the result
is in any case neither sufficiently well-known nor easily found in the literature. Various approaches to
the result are presented and discussed in detail, including one inspired by a problem in the proof theory
of intermediate logics that led us to the proof of the present paper. It can be seen as a modification of
Skolem’s argument from 1920 for his “Normal Form” theorem. “Geometric” being the infinitary version of
“coherent”, it is further shown that every infinitary first-order theory, suitably restricted, has a geometric
conservative extension, hence the title. The results are applied to simplify methods used in reasoning in
and about modal and intermediate logics. We include also a new algorithm to generate special coherent
implications from an axiom, designed to preserve the structure of formulae with relatively little use of
normal forms.
§1. Introduction. A theory is “coherent” (aka “geometric”) iff it is axiomatised by
“coherent implications”, i.e. formulae of a certain simple syntactic form (given in Defini-
tion 2.4). That every first-order theory has a coherent conservative extension
is regarded by some as obvious (and trivial) and by others (including ourselves) as non-
obvious, remarkable and valuable; it is neither well-enough known nor easily found in the
literature. We came upon the result (and our first proof) while clarifying an argument
from our paper [17]. Johnstone1 refers to it as being in Sacks’ lectures from 1975–76 on
saturated model theory; but it cannot be found in either edition of Sacks’ book [55] thereon.
A project proposal by Bezem et al from 2006 states that “every first-order theory has a
conservative (definitional) extension which is equivalent to a coherent theory” [7], without
a reference other than to Skolem [57] as having developed coherent logic to “obtain meta-
mathematical results in lattice theory and projective geometry”. (There is no mention in
Skolem [57] of coherent logic, under this or any other name; but he does exploit the rela-
tively simple form of axioms of these theories to obtain such results.) A swift treatment
can be found in Rathjen’s unpublished notes [52] on proof theory.
Antonius [1] showed in 1975 that “any classical theory can be translated in[to] the lan-
guage of coherent logic provided that the latter is enriched with sufficiently many relational
symbols”, as noted by Marquis and Reyes [37]. The result proved by Antonius is soundness
and faithfulness of the translation, namely (using the notation of Proposition I.3.7 in [1])
T ` φ⇒ ψ if and only if T `Coh φ⇒ ψ
1 Private correspondence in 2014.
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where the overline denotes the translation and `Coh the derivability relation (between
coherent theories and coherent sequents) using the rules of coherent logic. The result is
proved indirectly through a completeness result with respect to category-theoretic models;
conservativity is neither mentioned nor an obvious immediate consequence of the result.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend this result and relate it to Skolem [57] and to
modern developments [6, 32, 39, 51] (including one of our own [18]).
Skolem [57, Theorem 1] showed that from each first-order sentence A one can (by ex-
tending the language with new predicate symbols) construct a ∀∃-sentence A′ that (for
each domain D) is satisfiable in D iff A is satisfiable in D. Such a sentence, i.e. one that
begins with zero or more universal quantifiers, then has zero or more existential quantifiers,
followed by a quantifier-free “matrix”, is said by Skolem [57, Definition 1] to be “in normal
form” (and by van Heijenoort, as editor of the English translation [26] of Skolem [57],
to be in “Skolem normal form for satisfiability”). Jervell nicely summarises this theorem
as “Questions about satisfiability of logical statements can be reduced to satisfiability of
∀∃-statements by introducing new relation symbols” [30].
Other (but inequivalent) definitions of “normal form” and of “Skolem normal form” may
be found in the literature2: Skolem’s definition and proof make no mention of “Skolem
function symbols”, and the proof (of [57, Theorem 1]) makes no use of the axiom of
choice. His discussion, being geared towards a simpler proof of Lo¨wenheim’s theorem
about satisfiability in countable domains), concerns satisfiability rather than provability.
(For a modern perspective on his work, see von Plato [50].) We augment Skolem’s proof by
showing that it is also a proof that from each first-order sentence A one can construct an
extension L′ of its language L and a ∀∃-theory T∗ in L′ that is a conservative extension of
the theory T axiomatised by {A} (the point is already made, but without detail, by Bezem
and Coquand [6]). But one can do more, as we shall see.
All the formal definitions that we shall need of “positive” formulae, “coherent” and
“geometric implications” (and corresponding theories) as well as their “special” forms, are
given in Section 2.
These notions are important for many reasons:
1. In the context of a sequent calculus such as G3c [44, 61], special coherent implica-
tions as axioms can be converted directly [40] to inference rules without affecting the
admissibility of the structural rules (Weakening, Contraction and Cut);
2. In similar terms, coherent theories are “the theories expressible by natural deduction
rules in a certain simple form in which only atomic formulas play a critical part” [56];
3. Coherent implications I form sequents that give a Glivenko class [48]. In this case, the
result [39, 40], known as the first-order Barr’s Theorem3, states that if each Ii : 0 ≤
2 For example, [27, p 158] says that Skolem’s Theorem states the following: “Every formula of the
predicate calculus is deductively equivalent to a formula in prenex normal form in which each existential
quantifier symbol precedes each universal quantifier symbol (‘Skolem normal form’)”. We mention this
not by way of dissatisfaction with nomenclature but to emphasise the conventional wisdom that, so far as
deductive equivalence is concerned, the set of ∃∀-formulae is Skolem’s target.
3 The general form of Barr’s theorem [4, 63] is higher-order and includes the axiom of choice. Mints
[39] attributes the standard proof of the first-order version to Orevkov [48], although it does not appear
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i ≤ n is a coherent implication and the sequent I1, . . . , In ⇒ I0 is classically provable
then it is intuitionistically provable;
4. There are many examples [32, 45] of coherent/geometric theories: all algebraic theo-
ries, such as group theory and ring theory, all essentially algebraic theories, such as
category theory [24], the theory of fields, the theory of local rings, lattice theory [57],
projective geometry [8, 57], the theory of separably closed local rings (aka “strictly
Henselian local rings”) [62] and the infinitary theory of torsion abelian groups;
5. Coherent/geometric theories are preserved by pullback along geometric morphisms
between topoi [34, Ch. X];
6. Filtered colimits in Set of models of a coherent theory T are also models of T [32,
Lemma D.2.4.9];
7. Special coherent implications ∀x. C ⊃ D generalise the Horn clauses from logic pro-
gramming, where D is required to be an atom; in fact, they generalise the “clauses”
of disjunctive logic programs [38], where D is allowed to be a disjunction of atoms.
8. Effective theorem-proving for coherent theories can, with (in relation to resolution)
relative ease and clarity, be automated [6, 8, 21, 29, 46, 60]. As noted by Bezem et al
in these papers, the absence of Skolemisation (introduction of new function symbols)
is no real hardship, and the non-conversion to clausal form allows the structure of
ordinary mathematical arguments to be better retained.
In this paper we show that any sentence A in a first-order language L can be converted
to a finite set of coherent implications (in an extension L′ of L with finitely many new
predicate symbols) that has the same (so far as formulae in L are concerned) consequences
as A, i.e. (Theorem 7.7) the theory axiomatised by {A} has a coherent conservative
extension. In fact we prove a stronger result (Theorem 7.4), using a concept of “Skolem
extension”. Using Antonius’ translation [1], we also have the infinitary version (Theorem
12.3): every theory in Lω1ω has a geometric conservative extension.
The rest of the paper has the following structure:
• Section 2 gives both old and new definitions about formulas and theories;
• Sections 3 and 4 cover various notions of conservativity of extensions and of definitional
(and semi-definitional) extensions;
• Section 5 introduces a non-standard notion of “Skolem extension”, capturing the
essence of Skolem’s main idea in 1920 [57, Theorem 1];
• Section 6 reviews Skolem’s argument [57] that from every first-order theory we can
construct a ∀∃-theory, satisfiable in the same domains;
• Section 7 shows how this can be modified and extended to yield the main result, that
every first-order theory has a coherent conservative extension;
• Section 8 shows the same result using a method based on conjunctive normal form
(CNF) rather than on disjunctive normal form (DNF);
• Section 9 presents an example from Johnstone [32] illustrating the important point
that the definitional extensions considered here are not just abbreviative definitions;
therein. The result can nevertheless be reduced to one of the Glivenko classes [48] provided one uses, for
intuitionistic logic, a multi-succedent calculus with invertible rules, such as m-G3i in [61].
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• Section 10 recalls and illustrates the standard method from Negri [40] of convert-
ing special coherent implications into schematic inference rules and gives thereby an
alternative proof of the conservativity result;
• Section 11 presents some further examples, drawn from the authors’ earlier work on
labelled sequent calculi for non-classical logics [17, 41, 43];
• Section 12 presents (and slightly extends) related work—not just that of Skolem but
also (in chronological order) that of Antonius [1], Johnstone [32], Bezem and Co-
quand [6], Fisher [20, 21, 22], Polonsky [51] and Mints [39];
• Section 13 discusses Negri’s “generalised geometric implications” [42], an alternative
approach to the problem that not all first-order formulae are coherent implications;
• Section 14 discusses the application to labelled sequent calculi in greater generality;
• Section 15 discusses the work of Castellini and Smaill [11] and that of Ciabattoni et al
[13], whose approach to labelled sequent calculi for modal logics allows the encoding as
rules of (for the former) arbitrary first-order (and for the latter ∀∃4) frame conditions,
but less clearly and transparently;
• Section 16 illustrates the different approaches in Section 12 by their application to a
simple example, the formula ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx;
• Section 17 outlines a new coherentisation algorithm, of which the goal is to avoid
destruction of a formula’s structure (especially if it is already of the right form)—our
new definition of “weakly positive formula” plays a central role;
• Section 18 points to our implementation of the algorithms discussed;
• Section 19 is a brief comparison of the different algorithms;
• Section 20 concludes.
§2. Definitions. We recall (and clarify, and even vary) some definitions, well-known in
some communities; where no citation is given, we believe the definition to be new (in the
sense that the definiendum is new, or that it is old but is here varied in meaning, and not
that the definiens is a new concept). No real novelty is claimed for any of these defini-
tions. Our motive for variation is to introduce distinctions of terminology that allow, for
example, clear specifications of functions that convert formulae from one form to another.
In order to be (we hope) systematic, we have made a clear distinction between “coherent
implications” and the “special” ones; that between “coherent” and “geometric” is just a
matter of taste. In giving references, we have not attempted to give the first usage of every
piece of terminology.
Definition 2.1 (Positive formula [62]). A positive formula, also known as a “coher-
ent formula” [32, D 1.1.3], is a first-order formula built up from atoms (amongst which we
include equations) using conjunction, disjunction and existential quantification.
These formulae are not necessarily sentences: there may be free variables. An inequiv-
alent definition of “positive formula” (allowing universal quantification) is given by, for
example, Rothmaler [54, p 15].
4 Also known as Π2.
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Definition 2.2 (Special positive formula). A special positive formula is a disjunc-
tion of existentially quantified conjunctions of atoms.
Proposition 2.3. [32, D.1.3.8] Every positive formula is intuitionistically equivalent to
a special positive formula.
Proof. Routine, by using standard transformations such as distribution of ∧ over ∨.
QED
Definition 2.4 (Coherent implication). A coherent implication is a first-order sen-
tence that is the universal closure of an implication D1 ⊃ D2, where each implicand Di
is a positive formula. (This is more general than the definition of “coherent implication”
given by Bezem at al [6], which uses the definiens in our Definition 2.5. See [62, 63] (where
these are called “geometric sentences”), and [32, D.1.3.10] for (approximately) the same
concept.)
Various intuitionistically equivalent definitions can be obtained by moving existential
quantifiers and other operators around within each of the implicands: the important points
are that each implicand is positive and that positive formulae contain neither negation,
implication nor universal quantification. Note in particular that a coherent implication is
always a sentence and (despite the normal rules of language) is not necessarily either a
coherent formula (in the different senses of Bezem & Coquand [6] and of Johnstone [32])
or an implication; we have therefore chosen “positive” (as in [62, 63]) for the formulae that
some (including Johnstone [32]) call “coherent formulae”, but have no such solution to the
problem that coherent implications are not generally implications.
Definition 2.5 (Special coherent implication, SCI). A special coherent implication
(in [6], just a “coherent implication”) is a first-order sentence that is the universal closure
of an implication C ⊃ D, where C is a conjunction of atoms and D is a special positive
formula. In brief, we refer to an SCI.
A “folklore” reformulation was published by several people, notably Johnstone [32, Prop.
D.1.3.10(iii)], Simpson [56, p 24] and Palmgren [49]:
Proposition 2.6. Every coherent implication is intuitionistically equivalent to a con-
junction of SCIs.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 transform the implicands to special positive formulae, then
shift out the antecedent disjunctions and existential quantifiers using the equivalences5
(∀x. (A ∨B) ⊃ D) ≡ (∀x. A ⊃ D) ∧ (∀x. B ⊃ D) and, where D freely contains no variable
in y, the equivalence (∀x. ∃yC ⊃ D) ≡ ∀xy. C ⊃ D. QED
A coherent implication (in one or other of these senses) is also known as a “geometric
axiom” [40, 13], a “geometric sentence” [62], a “coherent axiom” [31], a “basic geometric
sequent” [56] or a “coherent formula” [6].
5 We use the dot notation after quantification to indicate wide scope; otherwise scope of quantification
is narrow. Thus, ∀x.A⊃B is another way of saying ∀x(A⊃B), and to be distinguished from ∀xA⊃B,
which could be written as (∀xA)⊃B.
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Fisher and Bezem [21] define the notion of a “Geolog rule” which looks similar; but
there is a subtle difference, concerning the binding of variables: for example, their rule
s(X,Y ) => e(X,Y, Z) is interpreted as ∀xy. s(x, y) ⊃ ∃z.e(x, y, z) rather than as the very
different ∀xyz. s(x, y) ⊃ e(x, y, z). The latter can be expressed as dom(Z), s(X,Y ) =>
e(X,Y, Z) where dom is a special predicate for “is in the domain”, allowing Geolog rules
to be written without quantifiers.
The formula C in an SCI can be the empty conjunction >; the formula D can be the
empty disjunction ⊥; in each case the obvious notational simplifications can be applied. In
particular, a universal sentence ∀xA (with quantifier-free A) can, by conversion of A to a
conjunction of clauses Ci ⊃ Di (so each Di is just a disjunction of atoms), be rewritten as
a conjunction of SCIs free of existential quantifiers (and succedent conjunctions).
Definition 2.7 (Coherent theory [6, 32]). A coherent theory is a set of sentences,
closed under derivability, axiomatised by coherent implications (without loss of generality,
these can be SCIs).
For example, the theory of local rings is a coherent theory [63]: the crucial axiom (about
there being precisely one maximal ideal) can be written as
∀x.> ⊃ (∃y. (xy = 1)) ∨ (∃y. (1− x)y = 1)).
Such a theory is also known as a “geometric theory” [34]; but the adjective “geometric” is
also applied [32] to infinitary theories, perhaps even allowing fixed point operators [9], and
we will follow this distinction, using “coherent” just in the finitary case and “geometric”
for the unrestricted case. In the infinitary case, arbitrary disjunctions are allowed so long
as only finitely many free variables are used (since only finitely many binding operations
can bind them).
Definition 2.8 (Geometric formula [32]). A geometric formula is a formula, with
only finitely many free variables, of (for example) Lω1ω [33] built up from ∧, ∨, ∃ and
infinitary disjunctions.
Definition 2.9 (Geometric implication [63]). A geometric implication is a sentence
of the form ∀x. H⊃G where H and G are geometric formulae.
Definition 2.10 (Special geometric implication). A special geometric implication
is a sentence of the form ∀x. H ⊃G where H is a finite conjunction of atoms and G is a
geometric formula.
Definition 2.11 (Geometric theory [34, 63]). A geometric theory is a set of sen-
tences, closed under derivability, axiomatised by geometric implications (wlog [32, Prop.
D.1.3.10 (iv)], these can be special geometric implications).
For example, the theory of torsion abelian groups is a geometric theory [32]: the crucial
axiom can (if nx abbreviates the sum of n copies of x) be written as
∀x.> ⊃
n=∞∨
n=1
nx = 0.
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§3. Conservative extensions and L-equivalence. We consider only first-order lan-
guages. It is convenient to refer to a formula in the language L as an L-formula; similarly
for theories. The following definition is well-known:
Definition 3.1 (Conservative extension [54]). A theory T′ in a language L′ extend-
ing the language L is a conservative extension of the L-theory T iff, for every formula of
L, it is provable in T iff it is provable in T′.
Definition 3.2 (L-equivalence). Two first-order formulae are L-equivalent iff they
prove the same L-formulae; and similarly for theories.
This is evidently an equivalence relation (on formulae or on theories); and a theory T′ is
a conservative extension of an L-theory T (i.e. theory in the language L) iff (i) T′ extends T
and (ii) T′ and T are L-equivalent. As we see (in outline) below, an extension of Skolem’s
argument implies that any first-order L-formula is L-equivalent to a single ∀∃-formula.
The main result can therefore also be presented as saying that any first-order L-theory T
is L-equivalent to a coherent theory (not necessarily expressed in L). (The generalisation
from one sentence to many is routine.) Since a special coherent implication is, with some
routine renaming of bound variables and movement of quantifiers6, a ∀∃-formula, and a
conjunction of such formulae is similarly equivalent to a single such formula, we also obtain
the claimed extension of Skolem’s result.
§4. Definitional and semi-definitional extensions. We recall the standard notion
of a “definitional extension” (by new predicate symbols) of a theory T in a language L:
new predicate symbols are added one-by-one, with “definitional equivalences” to express
their meanings added as axioms.
Definition 4.1 (Definitional equivalence). Let L be a language and P be a new pred-
icate symbol; a definitional equivalence is a sentence ∀x. P (x) ≡M(x), where M(x) is an
L-formula (and so does not contain P ).
Note that this term is already used in the sense of an equivalence between two theories
based on their having a common definitional extension [28]; but it suits our purposes better
than the alternative “predicate definition” or “explicit definition” for reasons discussed in
Section 9.
Definition 4.2 (Immediate definitional extension). An immediate definitional ex-
tension of a theory T in the language L is given by the addition of one new predicate symbol
P to L, with a definitional equivalence ∀x. P (x) ≡M(x) added as an axiom.
Axioms of T may be simplified by use of such an equivalence; but such simplification
has no effect on the theory (after inclusion of the new axiom) treated as a set of sentences
closed under deducibility.
6 For example, assuming that y and z are sensibly chosen, the special coherent implication
∀x.C ⊃ (∃yD1 ∨ ∃zD2) is equivalent to the ∀∃-formula ∀x∃yz. C ⊃ (D1 ∨D2).
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Definition 4.3 (Definitional extension [28], non-interacting set of sequences).
A definitional extension of a theory T in the language L is obtained as the composite of
a sequence of immediate definitional extensions, with the predicate symbols added in early
steps usable in later steps. [More generally, a non-interacting set of sequences of this kind
may be used, by which we mean that the predicate symbols added for one sequence are not
used in simplifying formulae in the other sequences.]
We discuss in Section 9 a minor scandal, that the adding of a predicate symbol to the
language and an axiom of this form to a theory is not exactly the same as using a definitional
abbreviation7 P (x) =def M(x), where occurrences of the new predicate symbol P are not
officially part of the language: for example, if nullary P abbreviates Q ⊃ R, then P is not
an atomic formula but an implication; the problem is that morphisms f between models
of the theory should in one case preserve8 P and in the other case need not preserve P .
We use definitional equivalences rather than definitional abbreviations.
We note that such a definitional equivalence can also be expressed both as the conjunction
of the two quantified implications ∀x. P (x) ⊃M(x) and ∀x.M(x) ⊃ P (x) and (inter alia)
as the conjunction of ∀x. (P (x)∧¬M(x))⊃⊥ and ∀x.>⊃(P (x)∨¬M(x)). With their use
of negation, the latter two kinds appear even less likely to be coherent implications—but
techniques for removing negations will be illustrated below.
For our purposes something weaker will suffice: “semi-definitional” extensions. We can
use not equivalences but implications in one direction or the other (and sometimes both),
with the purpose of reducing the additional axioms to those that are essential.
Definition 4.4 (Positive semi-definitional implication). Let P be a fresh predicate
symbol; a positive semi-definitional implication is of the form ∀x. P (x) ⊃ M(x) (where
M(x) is an L-formula, and so does not contain P ).
Definition 4.5 (Positive semi-definitional extension). Let A = ∀x. P (x) ⊃M(x)
be a positive semi-definitional implication; we may simplify any axiom by replacing any
positive occurrence of an instance of M(x) by the corresponding instance of P (x), giving
us (together with A) a positive semi-definitional extension.
Definition 4.6 (Negative semi-definitional implication). Let P be a fresh predi-
cate symbol; a negative semi-definitional implication is of the form ∀x.M(x)⊃P (x) (where
M(x) is an L-formula, and so does not contain P ).
Definition 4.7 (Negative semi-definitional extension). Let A = ∀x.M(x) ⊃ P (x)
be a negative semi-definitional implication; we may simplify any axiom by replacing any
negative occurrence of an instance of M(x) by the corresponding instance of P (x), giving
us (together with A) a negative semi-definitional extension.
Definition 4.8 (Immediate semi-definitional). An extension T′ of T is immediate
semi-definitional iff it is obtained by one of the above forms of semi-definitional extension.
7 Also known as an abbreviative definition.
8 If P (d1, . . . , dn) holds then so does P (f(d1), . . . f(dn)).
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One would like to define a semi-definitional extension to be obtained by applying im-
mediate semi-definitional extensions, but in practice one may wish to include immediate
definitional steps as well, in cases where the new predicate symbol is to abbreviate an ex-
pression occurring both positively and negatively. But, such a step cannot be decomposed
as two immediate semi-definitional extensions: after the first, the predicate symbol is no
longer fresh. We therefore define as follows:
Definition 4.9 (Semi-definitional extension). A semi-definitional extension is ob-
tained as the result of applying a non-interacting set of sequences of immediate definitional
or semi-definitional extensions.
§5. Skolem extensions.
Definition 5.1 (Skolem extension). Let L be a first-order language and T an L-
theory. A first-order theory T′ in an extension (with extra predicate symbols) L′ of L
is a Skolem extension of T iff
(i) every theorem of T is a theorem of T′ and
(ii) for some substitution of L-formulae for predicate symbols of L′ not in L, every theorem
of T′ becomes a theorem of T.
What we have called “a Skolem extension” captures the essential properties of the con-
struction by Skolem in [57], as opposed to the details of the construction. It differs from the
notion of “the Skolem extension” (e.g. as in van Dalen’s [14]) which refers to the extension
of a theory by augmenting the language with Skolem function symbols and the theory with
associated axioms (a technique not found in [57]), and includes the notion of one particular
kind of “extension by definition” [14, Thm 3.4.8].
Theorem 5.2. (a) Every definitional extension (using fresh predicate symbols but no
new function symbols) is a semi-definitional extension.
(b) Every semi-definitional extension (using fresh predicate symbols but no new function
symbols) is a Skolem extension.
(c) Every Skolem extension is a conservative extension.
(d) If T′ is a Skolem extension of T, then T′ and T are satisfiable in the same domains,
with the same interpretation of the old language.
Proof.
(a) Direct from the definition.
(b) Without loss of generality, consider an immediate semi-definitional extension. If it is
positive, then we have a fresh predicate symbol P and, as a new axiom, an “implica-
tion” ∀x. P (x) ⊃M(x). Suppose that A is an axiom of T in which one or more positive
occurrences of instances of M(x) have been replaced by instances of P (x), giving the
new axiom A′ for the new theory T′; the positivity of these occurrences ensures that
from the implication (treated as another new axiom) we may infer A′ ⊃ A, and thus
that A is a theorem of T′. A similar argument works for a negative semi-definitional
extension. That deals with condition (i) of Definition 5.1; as for (ii), the substitution
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of instances of M(x) for those of P (x) turns the implication into a trivial theorem of
first-order logic. A similar argument works for an immediate definitional extension.
(c) Routine: we only need to show that if B is an L-formula in T′ then it is already in T.
This is just a special case of (ii) (in Definition 5.1), since such a substitution leaves
L-formulae unchanged.
(d) If T′ is satisfiable in a domain D, then using (i) (in Definition 5.1) we show that T
is satisfiable in D; this is routine since (i) says just that T ⊆ T′. Conversely, if T is
satisfied by an interpretation I in D then by (ii) we show that T′ is satisfiable in D.
Let σ be the substitution given by (ii), and let I ′ be the interpretation in D given by
assigning to each predicate symbol R not in L the interpretation given by I to Rσ,
and otherwise interpreting symbols just the way I does. For A in T′, I ′(A) = I(Aσ)
and this is > since Aσ is, by (ii), in T and thus, by hypothesis, satisfied by I. In
each case, the remark about the interpretations of the old language being the same is
immediate. QED
§6. Skolem’s argument. Skolem [57] begins with a ∀∃∀-formula A, with quantifier-
free matrix U(x,y, z):
∀x∃y∀zU(x,y, z). (1)
He introduces a fresh predicate symbol R, setting R(x,y) = ∀zU(x,y, z) for all x,y. The
formula (1) can now be rewritten as
∀x∃yR(x,y). (2)
The definitional equivalence
∀xy. R(x,y) ≡ ∀zU(x,y, z) (3)
can be transformed9 into
∀xy. (R(x,y) ⊃ ∀zU(x,y, z)) ∧ (∀uU(x,y,u) ⊃ R(x,y)) (4)
and thus into
∀xyz∃u. (R(x,y) ⊃ U(x,y, z)) ∧ (U(x,y,u) ⊃ R(x,y)) (5)
Both (2) and (5) are now ∀∃-formulae10; and their conjunction can (with some suitable
renaming of bound variables) be rewritten as a logically equivalent ∀∃-formula A′. Satisfi-
ability of A (i.e. (1)) in a domain D immediately implies that of A′, and vice-versa. That
deals with a ∀∃∀-formula; the general case is similar, by using a sequence of new predicate
symbols.
Suppose now that A is in the language L. A′ is in an extension L′ of this language, but
in some sense equivalent to A. It is routine that A′ implies A (and hence that if A implies
some formula B, so does A′); conversely, if we have a proof that the two conjuncts making
up A′ imply an L-formula B, substitution of appropriate instances of ∀zU(x,y, z) for all
instances of R(x,y) in the proof convert the second conjunct (5) into a trivial first-order
9 Skolem used negation and disjunction rather than implication.
10 This would be false if we had used a definitional abbreviation rather than a definitional equivalence.
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theorem and the first (2) into A, leaving B unchanged; so A and A′ are L-equivalent. In
abstract terms, we have a definitional extension, using the definitional equivalence (3) and
the opportunity it gives us to rewrite (1) as (2). More generally, (2) and the first of the two
implications in (4) suffice to prove (1); we can forget about the second such implication
and thus have a semi-definitional extension, adequate to obtain the necessary results.
The construction (suitably generalised) shows that every first-order theory has a defi-
nitional extension that is a ∀∃-theory; by the result in Section 5 about such extensions,
we have both the conservativity of the extension (as noted without proof in [6]) and the
satisfiability in the same domains, the latter being Skolem’s conclusion [57].
§7. Skolem’s argument modified and extended.
7.1. Modification of Skolem’s argument. We begin with simple cases, to illustrate
the method, rather than launching immediately into full generality. Consider a sentence
∀x∃y.M1(x, y)∨· · ·∨Mn(x, y), where each Mi(x, y) is a conjunction of literals. We consider
wlog the case where each quantifier binds just one variable; the general case is similar. By
distributing ∃ over the disjunctions, we obtain the equivalent sentence
∀x. ∃yM1(x, y) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃yMn(x, y). (6)
Consider M1(x, y) ≡ P11(x, y) ∧ . . . P1r(x, y) ∧ ¬Q11(x, y) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Q1s(x, y), where each
P1j(x, y) is a positive literal (that is, an atom) and the remaining s literals ¬Q1j(x, y) are
negative. For each of the s negative literals ¬Q1j(x, y), let N1j be a fresh predicate symbol
and replace ¬Q1j(x, y) in (6) by N1j(x, y). We repeat this process for each conjunction
Mi(x, y).
The sentence is now of the form
∀x. ∃yM ′1(x, y) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃yM ′n(x, y) (7)
where each M ′i(x, y) is a conjunction of positive literals Pij(x, y) and Nij(x, y); the sen-
tence (7) is thus (if we add occurrences of > and ⊃) an SCI.
We have also to add as axioms some representation of the replacement of negative literals
by positive literals. To deal with M1(x, y), we consider the s sentences of the form
∀xy.N1j(x, y) ⊃ ¬Q1j(x, y)
which can be rewritten as the s SCIs
∀xy. (N1j(x, y) ∧Q1j(x, y)) ⊃ ⊥. (8)
Similar arrangements are made forM2(x, y), . . . ,Mn(x, y). We thus have a semi-definitional
extension: only half of each “definition” N1j(x, y) ≡ Q1j(x, y) is being added.
Proposition 7.1. The sentence (6), constructed as explained above, is implied by the
sentence (7) together with all the sentences (8).
Proof. Wlog we consider the case where n = 1, r = 1 and s = 1. It is routine that
∀x∃y. P11(x, y) ∧ ¬Q11(x, y) is implied by ∀x∃y. P11(x, y) ∧N11(x, y) and ∀xy.N11(x, y)⊃
¬Q11(x, y). The general case is similar. QED
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Proposition 7.2. If a formula does not contain any of the fresh predicate symbols and
is provable from (7) and (8), then it is already provable from (6).
Proof. Again we consider just the case with n = r = s = 1. We exploit the freshness
of the Ni. We replace uniformly throughout the proof all occurrences of Ni by ¬Qi, with
suitable arguments. The sentences (8) become closures of tautologies; the sentence (7)
becomes (6). The formula to be proved is unchanged. (More abstractly, we appeal to our
result about semi-definitional extensions.) QED
We can rephrase the two results (and the method of the second proof) as the following
theorem.
Theorem 7.3. Every [finitely axiomatisable] ∀∃-theory has a Skolem extension axioma-
tised by [finitely many] SCIs.
7.2. Extension of Skolem’s argument. The question now arises: how far can this
approach go in replacing any theory by SCIs? A quick answer is given by Skolem’s 1920
result (or, rather, our reformulation of it: see Section 6) that we can “replace” any theory
by a ∀∃-theory, so it almost follows from Theorem 7.3 that we can do it for any theory;
but we are interested in algorithms, so we continue to spell out a different algorithmic
approach.
Consider a sentence
∀x∃y∀u∃vA(x, y, u, v) (9)
where A(x, y, u, v) is quantifier-free. Let P be a fresh predicate symbol, of arity 2. We
consider the sentence
∀x∃yP (x, y) (10)
which is (once we add > and an implication symbol) an SCI. We also need to add as axiom
something based on what we want P (x, y) to mean: we start not with ∀xy. P (x, y) ⊃
∀u∃vA(x, y, u, v) but the equivalent (and better) SCI
∀xyu. P (x, y) ⊃ ∃vA(x, y, u, v). (11)
There is no need to add a converse implication, that has the disadvantage of not being
at all11 coherent: one direction suffices, corresponding to our need to prove only that the
new system implies the starting sentence but not conversely—substitutions deal with the
converse direction. Recall that A is not necessarily a positive literal but is quantifier-
free, i.e. wlog in disjunctive normal form—a disjunction of conjunctions of literals. The
techniques already illustrated, of (a) distributing ∃ across a disjunction and (b) replacing
any negative literals therein, can be applied, yielding (in place of (9)) a finite set of SCIs,
including (10), with the other new SCIs giving meaning to the new predicate symbols taking
also x and y as arguments, with the two crucial properties that (a) anything provable from
(9) can be proved from these SCIs and (b) any formula, not using the new predicate
symbols, provable from these new SCIs is already provable from (9).
11 It would be ∀xy.∀u∃vA(x, y, u, v) ⊃ P (x, y); the universal quantifier over u is not easily shifted.
GEOMETRISATION OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC 13
It is almost clear that the technique works for any finite number of quantifier alternations.
We state this as a theorem:
Theorem 7.4. Let A be any first-order sentence; then we may construct a finite set S
of SCIs that axiomatises a Skolem extension of the theory axiomatised by {A}.
Proof. We put together the techniques already illustrated in special cases earlier in this
section. We argue informally, where formally we need an induction on the number of pairs
of quantifier alternations in a prenex normal form of A. As before, we simplify the notation
by considering wlog a single variable for each quantifier alternation; but, to save space and
improve readability, we will use vectors x,y of variables rather than writing many variables
together. In particular, x will stand for the vector (x1, . . . xn); and (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) xi will
stand for the vector (x1, . . . , xi); and similarly for variants of y. We write x1 and x1 inter-
changeably, and x and xn interchangeably, according to context. Thus, ∀x2A(x2) stands
for ∀x1x2A(x1, x2); ∀x3y2∃y3A(x3,y3) stands for ∀x1x2x3y1y2∃y3A(x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3);
and so on.
Let A be a first-order sentence and consider a prenex normal form thereof, with the
propositional part converted to disjunctive normal form (hereinafter abbreviated DNF);
let this be
∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(x,y).
Let P1 be a fresh binary predicate symbol and consider, in place of A, the system of two
sentences {
∀x1∃y1P1(x1, y1)
∀x2y1. P1(x1, y1) ⊃ ∃y2∀x3∃y3 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(x,y).
Now let P2 be the fresh 4-place predicate symbol for which we postulate (for all x2,y2)
P2(x2,y2) ⊃ ∀x3∃y3 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(x,y).
Continuing this process, and at each stage moving a universal quantifier past an implication,
we replace the sentence A by the following system of n sentences A1, . . . , An, each of which
(except possibly for the last) is an SCI:
∀x1∃y1P1(x1,y1)
∀x2y1. P1(x1,y1) ⊃ ∃y2P2(x2,y2)
∀x3y2. P2(x2,y2) ⊃ ∃y3P3(x3,y3)
...
∀xi+1yi. Pi(xi,yi) ⊃ ∃yi+1Pi+1(xi+1,yi+1)
...
∀xnyn−1. Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1) ⊃ ∃ynB(x,y).
Since we have assumed that B(x,y) is in DNF, we can assume that it is of the form
B(x,y) ≡
k∨
j=1
Qj,1(x,y) ∧ · · · ∧Qj,n(j)(x,y) ∧ ¬Qj,n(j)+1(x,y) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Qj,n(j)+m(j)(x,y)
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As illustrated in the proof of Proposition 7.1, we introduce, for j = 1, . . . , k and l =
n(j) + 1, . . . , n(j) + m(j), fresh predicate symbols Nj,l for the negated predicate symbols
¬Qj,l with the m(1) + · · ·+m(k) axioms (all of which are SCIs) corresponding to partial
assumption of the “definitions” of Nj,l in terms of Qj,l:
∀xy. (Nj,l(x,y) ∧Qj,l(x,y)) ⊃ ⊥. (12)
Finally, we replace the occurrence of B(x,y) in the final formula An of the system by
the disjunction B′(x,y) of the following k conjunctions Cj(x,y) : 1 ≤ j ≤ k of atoms:
Qj,1(x,y) ∧ · · · ∧Qj,n(j)(x,y) ∧Nj,n(j)+1(x,y) ∧ · · · ∧Nj,n(j)+m(j)(x,y)
and distribute the existential quantifier ∃yn past the disjunction operators: that final
sentence is now replaced by an SCI:
∀xnyn−1. Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1) ⊃ ∃ynC1(x,y) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ynCk(x,y). (13)
The argument that the new system, comprising A1, . . . , An−1, (13) and the m(1) + · · ·+
m(k) sentences of the form (12), axiomatises a Skolem extension of the theory axiomatised
by A is now routine, already illustrated in special cases. We first need to check that A
is provable in the new system. Using A1 and A2, we can prove ∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2P2(x2,y2).
Using this and A3, we can prove ∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2∀x3∃y3P3(x3,y3). Continuing thus for (in
total) n− 1 steps, we obtain
∀x1∃y1...∀xn. ∃ynC1(x,y) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ynCk(x,y). (14)
From (12), each occurrence Nj,l(x,y) implies ¬Qj,l(x,y). Using such axioms, we see that
(14) implies, as required,
∀x1∃y1...∀xn∃ynB(x,y). (15)
We check that, for some substitution, the sentence A1 ≡ ∀x1∃y1P1(x1, y1) becomes
a theorem of the theory axiomatised by A. We first substitute ∀x2∃y2P2(x2,y2) for
P1(x1, y1); this introduces an occurrence of P2(x2,y2). We substitute ∀x3∃y3P3(x3,y3)
for that, and continue until, finally, we substitute ∀xn. ∃ynC1(x,y) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ynCk(x,y) for
Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1). We are left with a sentence with occurrences of the new symbols Nj,l;
we substitute ¬Qj,l for those. We end up with a sentence equivalent to A and without any
new symbols. The substitution we require is the composition of all these substitutions.
We also check, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, that, after the same substitution, which wlog begins
with that of ∀x′i∃yiPi(xi−1, x′i,yi) for Pi−1(xi−1,yi−1), the sentence
Ai ≡ ∀xiyi−1. Pi−1(xi−1,yi−1) ⊃ ∃yiPi(xi,yi)
becomes a theorem of first-order logic. (To avoid confusion of variables, we have applied
some renaming.) After the first part of this substitution we have
∀xiyi−1. ∀x′i∃yiPi(xi−1, x′i,yi) ⊃ ∃yiPi(xi,yi).
This is indeed such a theorem. The remaining parts of the substitution, removing the new
predicate symbols Pj (for i < j < n) and the new predicate symbols Nj,l, will not destroy
the theoremhood. It is thus a theorem of the theory axiomatised by A.
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Finally, the same substitution applied to ∀xy. (Nj,l(x,y)∧Qj,l(x,y)) ⊃ ⊥ generates the
quantified tautology ∀xy. (¬Qj,l(x,y) ∧Qj,l(x,y)) ⊃ ⊥. QED
Corollary 7.5. [57, Theorem 1]. Let A be a first-order sentence; then we may construct
a ∀∃-formula A′ satisfiable in the same domains as A.
Proof. Apply the theorem to A; the finite set of SCIs is easily converted to a single
∀∃-formula. Now use Theorem 5.2. QED
Corollary 7.6. [6]. Let A be a first-order sentence; then we may construct a finite set
S of SCIs s.t. A is a tautology iff S is inconsistent.
Proof. Apply the theorem to the negation of A; it follows that ⊥ is provable from ¬A iff
provable from S. QED
Theorem 7.7. Let T be a first-order theory; then we may construct a coherent conser-
vative extension of T.
Proof. Apply the theorem to each axiom of T; this gives us a coherent Skolem extension;
by Theorem 5.2, this is a conservative extension. QED
§8. Alternative approach using CNF. Instead of converting the propositional ma-
trix of a prenex normal form into DNF, we could instead have used conjunctive normal form
(abbreviated CNF). Let us see in detail how this is done and whether there are advantages
in doing so. With the letters previously used we have:
B(x,y) ≡
k∧
j=1
(
n(j)∨
i=1
¬Qj,i(x,y) ∨
n(j)+m(j)∨
i=n(j)+1
Qj,i(x,y))
which is a conjunction of clauses, i.e. of disjunctions of literals. For each of these clauses
(unless it is atomic) we invent a new name Nj , and add (for each j) the semi-definitional
implication
∀xy. Nj(x,y) ⊃ (
n(j)∨
i=1
¬Qj,i(x,y) ∨
n(j)+m(j)∨
i=n(j)+1
Qj,i(x,y)). (16)
We then move all the negative literals to the left and obtain as many new SCIs as there
are new names: observe, as an advantage, that there is one per clause rather than (as we
had with the use of DNF) one per literal. We thus have the (at most k) SCIs
∀xy. (Nj(x,y) ∧
n(j)∧
i=1
Qj,i(x,y)) ⊃
n(j)+m(j)∨
i=n(j)+1
Qj,i(x,y).
The last step, after removal of all universal quantifiers, is of the form
∀xnyn−1. Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1) ⊃ ∃yn. N1(x,y) ∧ · · · ∧Nk(x,y).
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Verification that this has the right properties is similar to that in Section 7; once we have
considered representation of SCIs as rules we will use that representation to redo this part
of the proof.
As an advantage, we obtain (in theory) that already mentioned—a reduction in the
number of new SCIs. (In practice, the situation isn’t necessarily better.) However, the
form of an SCI involves, in the succedent, a disjunction, and the use of DNF rather than
of CNF leads more transparently to such a disjunction—including more frequently the
idempotence of the operation, i.e. the preservation of SCIs by the algorithm.
§9. Caution: example of a non-coherent theory. We now look at a particular
case of a simple theory that, as observed by Johnstone [32, p 887], is not a coherent
theory (and is not even Morita-equivalent to such a theory): the theory PM of posets in
which every element is below a maximal element. PM is axiomatised by ∀x. x ≤ x (i.e.
reflexivity), ∀xyz. (x≤y ∧ y≤z) ⊃ x≤z (i.e. transitivity), ∀xy. (x≤y ∧ y≤x) ⊃ x=y (i.e.
antisymmetry) and ∀x∃y. x≤ y ∧ ∀z. y≤ z ⊃ y= z. The first three axioms are (in effect)
SCIs; the last is not. Exploiting the techniques we are considering, and using the fresh
unary predicate symbol M , we can build a semi-definitional extension of PM by replacing
the last axiom by ∀x∃y. x≤ y ∧M(y), ∀y.M(y) ⊃ ∀z. y≤ z ⊃ y = z—or, equivalently, by
the SCIs ∀x.> ⊃ ∃y. x≤y ∧M(y) and ∀yz. (M(y) ∧ y ≤ z) ⊃ y = z.
Note that the implication ∀y.∀z(y≤ z⊃ y = z)⊃M(y) is not required, since M occurs
only positively in the first new axiom. But, to maintain compatibility with Johnstone’s
presentation and argument, we add it as follows: let N be a fresh binary predicate sym-
bol, with as axiom the definitional equivalence ∀xy.N(x, y) ≡ ¬(x = y); this can be
represented as the SCIs ∀x.N(x, x) ⊃ ⊥ and ∀xy.> ⊃ (x = y ∨ N(x, y)) and allows
the missing implication to be represented as ∀y.> ⊃ (M(y) ∨ ∃z. y ≤ z ∧ N(y, z)), since
¬(y≤z⊃y = z) ≡ (y ≤ z ∧ ¬(y = z)).
So, the theory PM has a definitional extension PM+ axiomatisable by SCIs; the two
theories have essentially the same models. The models of this extended theory are (since
its axioms are coherent implications) closed [32, Lemma D.2.4.9, p 886] under filtered
colimits as constructed in the category of structures over its signature; it seems to follow
that the original theory has the same property, and thus is coherent.
But, the example [32, p 887] shows the theory PM to be not coherent. Consider the
non-zero natural numbers n =def {0, 1, . . . n− 1} as posets, each with a maximal element
n−1 below which every element lies. The homomorphisms between such posets are just the
order-preserving maps. Among these we can consider the inclusions n → m (for n ≤ m,
taking any element x < n to itself). These inclusions form a filtered direct system (of
models and homomorphisms). The ordered set N of natural numbers (together with the
obvious inclusions n → N) is its colimit in the category of structures over the signature
(which does not include M). But this cannot be the colimit once M has to be preserved;
it has no maximal element. A refined version of this argument [32] shows that PM is not
equivalent to a coherent theory over any signature.
However, the extended theory PM+ includes the extra predicate symbols M and N ,
which have to be preserved by homomorphisms; the inclusion maps in the example don’t
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preserve maximal elements, i.e. don’t preserve M , so they are not homomorphisms; so
they cannot form a filtered direct system as evidence (in the absence of a colimit) for
non-coherence.
It is for this reason that we have distinguished carefully between the notions of “defini-
tional extension” and of “definitional abbreviation”.
§10. Replacement of SCIs by rules. The SCIs (7) and (8) may be turned, in the
standard way [40], into rules to supplement a two-sided classical sequent calculus such as
G3c from [61], without affecting cut-admissibility. This exploits the relatively simple form
(conjunction of atoms) of the antecedent C of an SCI ∀x. C ⊃ D, and can be regarded as a
form ofQ-style focusing [16]: in root-first proof search, to use an antecedent SCI ∀x. C ⊃ D,
rather than setting an antecedent formula C as a new goal (suitably instantiated, which
can be difficult) and branching with the appropriate instance of the succedent D as a new
assumption, one may just wait until the atoms making up an instance of C are already in
the sequent’s antecedent.
10.1. Illustration 1. We illustrate this with an example: consider the sentence (of the
form (6)):
∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬(yRx) (17)
which we may consider as expressing that R is “strictly serial”. Let S be a new binary
predicate12 symbol, to express the negation of R; (7) and (8) simplify to
∀x∃y.> ⊃ (xRy ∧ ySx)
and
∀xy. (xRy ∧ xSy) ⊃ ⊥
respectively; from these we obtain by the method in [40] the two schematic rules
xRy, ySx,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ α xRy, xSy,Γ⇒ ∆ β
where, in the first rule, y is a fresh variable and wlog x occurs in Γ,∆. The fact that the
rules are “schematic” includes the possibility of instantiating x in the first rule and both x
and y in the second rule by arbitrary terms, just as Γ and ∆ are instantiable as arbitrary
multisets.
12 An early example of this trick for handling negations is that in [53, p 127]; another is in [2, p 746].
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Using just the two rules and the standard quantifier and logical rules, but not (17), we
obtain a proof of, in effect, (17), as follows:
aRb, bSa⇒ aRb
aRb, bSa, bRa⇒ β
aRb, bSa⇒ ¬(bRa) R¬
aRb, bSa⇒ aRb ∧ ¬(bRa) R∧
aRb, bSa⇒ ∃y. aRy ∧ ¬(yRa) R∃
⇒ ∃y. aRy ∧ ¬(yRa) α
⇒ ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬(yRx) R∀
10.2. Illustration 2. As a further illustration of the method by which this technique
is exploited in practice, and giving an alternative proof of the conservativity part of the
main result above, we show how to exploit the special structure (as SCIs) of the axioms
obtained. As in the previous section, we start with a prenex normal form of an arbitrary
first-order formula
∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(x,y)
with the quantifier-free part in DNF
B(x,y) ≡
k∨
j=1
(
n(j)∧
i=1
Qj,i(x,y) ∧
n(j)+m(j)∧
i=n(j)+1
¬Qj,i(x,y))
and add new primitive predicates Pi, Nj,l as in Section 7. By translation of all the SCIs
into rules [40], we obtain the following system of n+m(1) + · · ·+m(k) rules13.
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ R1, (y1 fresh)
P2(x2,y2),Γ⇒ ∆
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆ R2, (y2 fresh)
...
{Qj(xn,yn),Nj(xn,yn),Γ⇒ ∆}j=1,...,k
Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1),Γ⇒ ∆ Rn, (yn fresh)
Nj,l(xn,yn), Qj,l(xn,yn),Γ⇒ ∆
R(n+1,j,l), (j = 1, . . . , k; l = n(j) + 1, . . . , n(j) +m(j))
In Rn, for each j = 1, . . . , k, the notation Qj(xn,yn) stands for the n(j)-vector of atoms
Qj,1(xn,yn), . . . , Qj,n(j)(xn,yn); and similarly Nj(xn,yn) stands for the m(j)-vector
Nj,n(j)+1(xn,yn), . . . , Nj,n(j)+m(j)(xn,yn). The freshness condition inRi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
13 We call this a system of rules borrowing the terminology from [42] even though there is here no
external condition on the dependences of the variables and the order of the rules. The order in which the
rules are applied is imposed by their syntactic form: read root-first, the first introduces P1, the second P2
only after P1 has been introduced, and so on.
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indicates that yi may not appear free in the conclusion; no such constraint on xi is required,
and wlog xi appears in the conclusion (but not necessarily in Pi−1(xi−1,yi−1)).
Next, we show that if Γ⇒ ∆ is any sequent in the language of the theory T axiomatised
by {A} and G3cA the extension of G3c by the rules corresponding to A in the way detailed
above, we have:
Theorem 10.1. G3cA ` Γ⇒ ∆ if and only if G3c+A+cut ` Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. First, observe that A is derivable in G3cA as follows:
....
{Qj(xn,yn),Nj(xn,yn)⇒ B(xn,yn)}j=1,...,k
{Qj(xn,yn),Nj(xn,yn)⇒ ∃ynB(xn,yn)}j=1,...,k R∃
Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1)⇒ ∃ynB(xn,yn) Rn
Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1)⇒ ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R∀....
P2(x2,y2)⇒ ∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn)
P1(x1, y1)⇒ ∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R2
P1(x1, y1)⇒ ∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R∀
P1(x1, y1)⇒ ∃y1∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R∃
⇒ ∃y1∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R1
⇒ ∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2 . . . ∀xn∃ynB(xn,yn) R∀
⇒ A ≡
where each of the top-sequents is derivable by propositional steps from either initial se-
quents or applications of the zero-premiss rules Rn+1. Observe that, in the application of
R1, the variable x1 occurs in the lower sequent and y1 is fresh (and similarly for R2, . . . ).
It follows by the main result in [40] (elimination of cuts in coherent theories with axioms
as rules) that every derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆ in G3c+A+cut gives a derivation of the same
sequent in G3cA.
For the converse, we prove that if a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ in the original language (not extended
with the new predicate symbols Pi and Nj,l) is derivable in the system obtained by the
extension with the rules Ri, then the sequent A,Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3c.
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To simplify things14, we prove the result for A ≡ ∀x1∃y1∀x2∃y2B(x,y). Observe that in
this case the system of rules to be added consists of the following15
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ R1, (y1 fresh)
{Qj(x2,y2),Nj(x2,y2),Γ⇒ ∆}j=1,...,k
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆ R2, (y2 fresh)
Nj,l(x2,y2), Qj,l(x2,y2),Γ⇒ ∆
R(3,j,l), (j = 1, . . . , k; l = n(j) + 1, . . . , n(j) +m(j)).
As a preliminary fact, observe that if one of the rules has been used in a derivation of
Γ⇒ ∆, then all must have been used: If Ri has been used, then also Ri−1 up to R1 must
have been used, else the endsequent would contain an atomic subformula in the extended
language (in the negative part). On the other hand, if Ri has been used in a non-trivial
way, i.e. with its active formulas principal somewhere, then its active formulas must either
be formulas of the original language (such as the Qj in R2) or principal in another of the
added rules because they cannot be principal in initial sequents else we would find atoms
of the extended language as (positive) subformulas of the conclusion, but this is ruled out
by assumption. A derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆ in the extended system thus contains in a typical
branch the following steps:
Nj,l(x2,y2), Qj,l(x2,y2),Γ
′′ ⇒ ∆′′ R(3,j,l)
... D′
Qj(x2,y2),Nj(x2,y2),Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′
P1(x1,y1),Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′ R2, (y2 fresh)
... D
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ R1, (y1 fresh)
We now show how to transform this derivation into a derivation in G3c of the sequent
A,Γ⇒ ∆. We start by replacing everywhere the new atomic predicate symbols Nj,l(x2,y2)
by their “definienda”16, namely the formulas ¬Qj,l(x2,y2). This change does not affect
initiality of the initial sequents in the derivation because an atom of the form Nj,l(x2,y2)
cannot be principal therein, since it cannot be in the conclusion (which would violate the
assumption on Γ ⇒ ∆). On the other hand, the replacement turns instances of R3 into
derivable sequents of the form Q,¬Q,Γ′′ ⇒ ∆′′: in this case their derivations are added.
The procedure is performed uniformly for every premiss of the rule R2. The result is a
14 The general case is obtained by supplementing the argument with an easy induction on the number
of nesting of quantifiers.
15 Recall that x1 is just x1, but that x2 is (x1, x2), and similarly for y1 and y2, and so on.
16 An abuse of language: we are not using abbreviative definitions.
GEOMETRISATION OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC 21
derivation is G3c of each of the sequents, for j = 1, . . . , k,
Qj,1(x2,y2), . . . , Qj,n(j)(x2,y2),¬Qj,n(j)+1(x2,y2), . . . ,¬Qj,n(j)+m(j)(x2,y2),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′.
By application of L∧ to each of these sequents and L∨ to the k sequents obtained, we
obtain a derivation in G3c of
B(x2,y2),Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′.
Since y2 is not in Γ
′,∆′ by assumption, we can continue the derivation by a step of L∃; a
further step of L∀ gives
∀x2∃y2B(x2,y2),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′.
The derivation is then continued by logical steps as in D, but with P1(x1,y1) replaced by
∀x2∃y2B(x2,y2), taking to the sequent
∀x2∃y2B(x2,y2),Γ⇒ ∆.
An application of L∃ (licensed by the condition on y1 not being in Γ,∆) and of L∀ gives
A,Γ⇒ ∆.
A cut with⇒ A gives a derivation of the sequent from the axiomatic sequent corresponding
to A. QED
10.3. Illustration with rules from CNF-based algorithm. Similarly, if we used
instead the CNF-based translation, we obtain as before a system of n+ k rules:
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ R1, (y1 fresh)
P2(x2,y2),Γ⇒ ∆
P1(x1,y1),Γ⇒ ∆ R2, (y2 fresh)
...
N1(x,y), . . . , Nk(x,y),Γ⇒ ∆
Pn−1(xn−1,yn−1),Γ⇒ ∆ Rn, (yn fresh)
Qj,n(j)+1(x,y),Γ⇒ ∆ . . . Qj,n(j)+m(j)(x,y),Γ⇒ ∆
Nj(x,y), Qj,i(x,y), . . . , Qj,n(j)(x,y),Γ⇒ ∆
R(n,j), (j = 1, . . . , k)
Observe that the last displayed rule scheme has k instances, corresponding to the k con-
juncts of the CNF; and the jth instance is branching, with as many premisses are there are
positive literals in Nj(x,y).
The proof that the set of rules thus obtained gives a system equivalent to the one adding
A and cut to G3c is obtained though an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 10.1. The
conservativity result is in the same way a corollary of the equivalence thus established.
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§11. Examples and improvements. We now consider two further examples. The
first is a proof of the McKinsey axiom from modal logic; the second is a frame condition
for the intermediate logic of Kreisel and Putnam.
11.1. McKinsey axiom. The McKinsey axiom 23A ⊃ 32A is provable from the
McKinsey condition (on the accessibility relation R) ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ∀z. yRz ⊃ y = z [12,
p 82]. Using a new predicate symbol M (for “maximal”, i.e. with Mx representing
∀y. xRy ⊃ x= y) we obtain (by the method either of Section 7 or of Section 8) the SCIs
∀x.>⊃∃y. xRy ∧My and ∀xy. (Mx ∧ xRy)⊃x = y, generating rules γ and δ, as used in
the following 10-step derivation:
y : A, . . .⇒ y : A, . . . Id
y = z, y = w, . . . , w : A, . . .⇒ z : A, . . . =
yRz, yRw, xRy,My,w : A, y : 3A, . . .⇒ z : A, y : 2A, . . . δ, δ
xRy,My, y : 3A, . . .⇒ y : 2A, . . . R2, L3
xRy,My, x : 23A⇒ x : 32A L2, R3
x : 23A⇒ x : 32A γ
⇒ x : 23A ⊃ 32A R ⊃
11.2. The Kreisel-Putnam condition. The second example is taken in part from
[17]. KP17, Kreisel-Putnam logic, is axiomatised over Int (i.e. intuitionistic logic) by the
schema
(¬A→ (B ∨ C))→ ((¬A→ B) ∨ (¬A→ C)). (18)
This is an intermediate logic with a characteristic frame condition that is not a coherent
implication. This condition (see [12, p. 55]) is, with the symbol R for the accessibility
relation of [12] replaced by ≤ and some negative antecedent formulae converted to positive
succedent formulae,
∀xyz. (x ≤ y ∧ x ≤ z) ⊃ (y ≤ z ∨ z ≤ y ∨ ∃u. x ≤ u ∧ u ≤ y ∧ u ≤ z ∧ F (u, y, z))
(19)
where F (u, y, z) abbreviates18 ∀v. u≤ v ⊃ ∃w. v≤w ∧ (y≤w ∨ z≤w); the complexity of
F (u, y, z) upsets the coherence, and no obvious single alternative formula suggests itself
as being both equivalent to (19) and also a coherent implication. Note that the formula
(19) is (when the definitional abbreviation is expanded) rather long, and not a coherent
implication, even if we distribute ∧ past ∨ in its last part.
17 We remark a coincidence of nomenclature with the KP used for a different modal axiom in another
context, namely for the knowability principle A ⊃ 3KA of intuitionistic bimodal logic. We also observe
that a frame condition similar to the McKinsey condition and sufficient to derive the principle, namely
∀x∃y. xR3y ∧ ∀z. yRKz ⊃ x ≤ z, was rendered as a system of rules in [35] for the proof-theoretical analysis
of the Church-Fitch knowability paradox.
18 This really is a definitional abbreviation.
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However, instead of using a definitional abbreviation, we add the new ternary predicate
symbol G and replace F in (19) by G, obtaining
∀xyz. (x ≤ y ∧ x ≤ z) ⊃ (y ≤ z ∨ z ≤ y ∨ ∃u. x ≤ u ∧ u ≤ y ∧ u ≤ z ∧ G(u, y, z)).
(20)
In addition, we include not the obvious axiom
∀uyz.G(u, y, z) ⊃ ∀v. (u ≤ v ⊃ (∃w(v ≤ w ∧ y ≤ w) ∨ ∃w(v ≤ w ∧ z ≤ w)))
but the equivalent axiom
∀uvyz. (G(u, y, z) ∧ u ≤ v) ⊃ (∃w(v ≤ w ∧ y ≤ w) ∨ ∃w(v ≤ w ∧ z ≤ w)). (21)
The formulae (20) and (21) are SCIs. By an argument generalising that given above, (20)
and (21) are enough to prove (19); and anything in the language (but not mentioning G)
and provable from (20) and (21) is provable from (19).
This pair (20) and (21) of SCIs is not delivered by our implementation of the algorithms
of Sections 7 and 8. (The DNF-based version does best of these two.) However, our new
algorithm in Section 17 does the trick.
It follows that the frame conditions for KP can wlog be chosen to be SCIs, locating KP
within the range of intermediate logics covered by the methods of [17].
Illustrating again the use of the rules generated from SCIs, we show that those—R(20)
and R(21)—for KP suffice to prove the characteristic axiom (18) for KP. Consider the
following:
y ≤ z, . . . z ≤ y, . . . x ≤ u, u ≤ y, u ≤ z,G(u, y, z), . . .
x ≤ y, x ≤ z, x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C), y : ¬A, z : ¬A⇒ y : B, z : C R(20)
x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C)⇒ x : ¬A→ B, x : ¬A→ C R→, R→
x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C)⇒ x : (¬A→ B) ∨ (¬A→ C) R∨
⇒ x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C)→ (¬A→ B) ∨ (¬A→ C) R→
of which the first premiss is (ignoring steps of reflexivity)
. . . , y : ¬A, z : ¬A⇒ y : ¬A, . . . Id
y ≤ z, . . . , y : B ⇒ y : B, . . . Id . . .
y ≤ z, . . . , y : B ∨ C ⇒ y : B, z : C L∨
y ≤ z, x ≤ y, x ≤ z, x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C), y : ¬A, z : ¬A⇒ y : B, z : C L→
and the second is proved similarly.
We consider the third premiss:
x ≤ u, u ≤ y, u ≤ z,G(u, y, z), . . . , y : ¬A, z : ¬A⇒ u : ¬A, . . . P
x ≤ u, u ≤ y, u ≤ z,G(u, y, z), . . . , x : ¬A→ (B ∨ C), y : ¬A, z : ¬A⇒ y : B, z : C L→
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of which the second premiss P is the easily proved u ≤ y, u ≤ z, u : B∨C, . . .⇒ y : B, z : C.
As for the first premiss, it follows by R→ from
v ≤ w, . . . , v : A⇒ w : A, . . . Id . . . , w : ⊥ ⇒ . . . L⊥
v ≤ w, y ≤ w, . . . , y : ¬A, . . . , v : A⇒ . . . L→ . . .
u ≤ v, x ≤ u, u ≤ y, u ≤ z,G(u, y, z), . . . , y : ¬A, z : ¬A, v : A⇒ v : ⊥, . . . R(21)
of which the second premiss is proved just like the first.
§12. Related work. In this section we mention and discuss prior occurrences of coher-
entisation techniques, in chronological order.
12.1. Skolem. As noted in our introduction, Skolem [57] proves as his “Normal form
theorem” (for satisfiability) that, from an arbitrary first-order sentence, one can construct
a ∀∃-formula satisfiable in the same domains. This is not a statement about provability,
but19 about its dual, satisfiability; however, our method is similar to his, starting from
a prenex normal form, and with use of new predicate symbols to replace more complex
formulae. In his proof, no use is made of disjunctive or conjunctive normal forms, and the
formulae constructed are not necessarily coherent implications.
The proof can, however, be recast (with few changes, as indicated above in Section 6) as
a proof that, for every first-order sentence A, there is a ∀∃-formula in a language extending
that of A that axiomatises a definitional (and thus conservative) extension of the theory
{A}; this point is already made in [6] (see below). It is thus recast as a proof that every
first-order theory T has a ∀∃-theory T′ as what we have called a “Skolem extension”.
12.2. Antonius. Reyes [53] reported, in outline, Antonius’ result [1, p 34–36] as “every
classical theory may be rendered coherent by extending the language”. Antonius defined,
for each formula A of a first-order language L, a positive formula A in an extended language
L′, as follows: P (x) = P (x) for atomic P (x); B ∧ C = B ∧ C, B ∨ C = B ∨ C, B ⊃ C =
NB ∨ C, ¬B = NB, ∃xB = ∃xB, and ∀xB = N∃x¬B, where NB (resp. N∃x¬B) is a new
predicate symbol whose arity is the number of free variables of B (resp. of ∃x¬B). This
needs minor modification: NB should be applied to the appropriate arguments, i.e. those
free in B, and similarly20 for N∃x¬B, using (other than x) those free in B.
Let T be a theory, T′ the theory obtained by replacing each axiom A of T by >⊃A,
and T the theory obtained by adding as axioms to T′ all the coherent implications21
∀x.> ⊃ (NB(x)(x) ∨B(x)) and ∀x.(NB(x)(x) ∧ B(x)) ⊃ ⊥; these are just those obtained
in cases where the subformula translated is either a negation or universally quantified.
Her main result then is that a theory T proves a sequent B ⇒ B′ (implicitly universally
19 Well known results [14, Ch 3.4, Exercise 5] about “dual Skolem normal form” or “Skolem normal
form for validity” concern the replacement of an arbitrary formula by a ∃∀-formula, or even just a ∀-formula
if new function symbols are used. For reasons discussed in [6], new function symbols are best avoided if
possible. See also our discussion below in Section 15.
20 Omission of a hand-enterable negation symbol hereabouts in the original is an obvious oversight.
21 Antonius’ presentation uses unquantified but schematic sequents, a terminology we have avoided in
order to give a unified presentation.
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quantified) iff T proves the sequent B ⇒ B′, where the latter form of proof is in a sequent
calculus (geared to interpretation in coherent categories) restricted to coherent sequents
(which is, by Barr’s Theorem, much the same as classical provability). We shall use ordi-
nary first-order logic without restriction to coherent sequents.
The argument is model-theoretic. Nothing is said about conservativity. Note (as above)
that the axioms ∀x.> ⊃ (NB(x)(x) ∨ B(x)) and ∀x. (NB(x)(x) ∧ B(x)) ⊃ ⊥ are just the
two halves of the definitional equivalence
∀x. NB(x)(x) ≡ ¬B(x) (22)
transformed (by ordinary rules of logic) into coherent implications. Nevertheless, we can
prove conservativity.
Lemma 12.1. Let A be a sentence, axiomatising the theory T, and T the theory axioma-
tised by > ⊃ A and the coherent implications generated from A by Antonius’ method. Then,
for every subformula B(x) of A, the theory T proves the formulae B(x) ⊃ B(x) and B(x)
cimpB(x).
Proof. Without loss of generality, A contains no universal quantifiers or implications, all
having been rewritten using negation, ∃ and ∨. We now argue by induction on the structure
of B(x). If B(x) is atomic, the result is immediate. If it is disjunctive or conjunctive or
existential, the inductive hypothesis applies. If it is a negation ¬C(x), then, by inductive
hypothesis, T proves C(x) ⊃ C(x) and C(x) ⊃ C(x), from which, together with the
definition ¬C(x) = NC(x)(x) and the definitional equivalence (22) instantiated at C(x),
we obtain both ¬C(x) ⊃ ¬C(x) and ¬C(x) ⊃ ¬C(x). QED
Theorem 12.2. Let A be a sentence, axiomatising the theory T; then the theory T ax-
iomatised by > ⊃ A and the coherent implications generated from A by Antonius’ method
is a coherent definitional (and thus conservative) extension of T.
Proof. The theory T, with its new predicate symbols NB for all the negative subformulae
¬B of A, is axiomatised by the definitional equivalences ∀x. NB(x)(x) ≡ ¬B(x), together
with A abbreviated using these equivalences as A, all presented using coherent implications.
QED
With care one can reformulate the argument using only half of the new axioms, exploiting
the polarities with which the various negated subformulae occur.
The coherent implications generated by this method are not necessarily special ones;
the construction in Proposition 2.6 may be used to make the further conversion necessary
before these new axioms can be converted to rules.
The same argument (mutatis mutandis) also establishes the following:
Theorem 12.3. Let T be a theory of infinitary first-order logic (as defined in Section 2)
and A be a sentence of that logic; then the theory T axiomatised by > ⊃ A and the geo-
metric implications generated from A by this infinitary extension of Antonius’ method is a
geometric definitional (and thus conservative) extension of T. QED
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From this theorem, not so easily obtained by using our own argument based on prenex
normal form and DNF, we obtain our justification of the use of “geometrisation” rather
than “coherentisation” in the paper’s title.
12.3. Johnstone. The work of Johnstone [32, Lemma D 1.5.13, p 858] is worth report-
ing verbatim:
“Let T be a first-order theory over a signature Σ. Then there is a signature
Σ′ containing Σ, and a coherent theory T′ over Σ′, such that for any Boolean
coherent category C we have
T−Mod(C)e ' T′−Mod(C).
The theory T′ is sometimes called the Morleyization of T, in honour of M. Morley
(cf. [28]).”
The (easily missed) suffix e refers to the restriction to elementary morphisms within the
category of models. For the purposes of the present paper, C may be taken to be the
category of sets. The reference [28] is to Hodges’ book on model theory, which disavows
the name “Morleyization” in favour of “atomisation”, on the grounds that it was nothing
to do with Morley; see also Blass’ comment [10] that “this name for such a triviality could
be considered an insult to Michael Morley”. Johnstone later points out [32, p 923] that
he had (in his Lemma D 1.5.13) showed “that every first-order formula over the original
signature Σ of T is classically provably equivalent, in its Morleyization T′, to a coherent
formula over the enlarged signature Σ′ of the latter)”. To show conservativity, one needs
to show more; nevertheless, from this Lemma one can extract a conservativity result.
In personal correspondence (February 2014) he has remarked
“I’m not sure who first used the construction to replace an arbitrary first-order
theory by a coherent one; it may well have been Makkai and Reyes, but as far as
I can see it doesn’t appear in their book.”
The book referred to is [36]. He also remarked
“I think I first learned about it from some lectures by Gerry Sacks on saturated
model theory which I attended during the year 1975–6.”
It does not appear in the book on this topic by Sacks [55]. Johnstone has also written (in
October 2014)
“The first concerns the name ‘Morleyization’: . . . it was the term used by Gerry
Sacks, . . . , and he clearly didn’t consider it an insult; and Hodges’ book was the
only place where I could find it in print.”.
The method Johnstone describes is to add, for each formula B of the language, two
new predicate symbols (of appropriate arity) CB and DB, together with, as axioms, the
coherent implications ∀x.(CB(x) ∧ DB(x)) ⊃ ⊥ and ∀x.> ⊃ (CB(x) ∧ DB(x)); then we
add an axiom > ⊃ CA for each axiom A of the theory T; and finally, for each formula B,
a further pair of axioms according to the structure of B: If B is atomic with variables x,
we add both ∀x.CB(x) ⊃ B(x) and its converse ∀x.B(x) ⊃ CB(x); if B is a conjunction
B1∧B2 we add ∀x.CB(x) ⊃ (CB1(x1)∧CB2(x2)) (where xi are the free variables of Bi) and
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its converse; and similarly for other forms of B, using the DB symbols where the polarity
changes, as in ∀x.C¬B′(x) ⊃ DB′(x) and its converse.
This leads to a great many new axioms (four for each formula of the language): in
practice far fewer such axioms need to be included, as outlined in our next subsection. (The
category-theoretic perspective however is, in Johnstone’s words, “to adopt the approach
where every first-order formula in the language of T becomes T′-provably equivalent to an
atomic formula in the extended language”, thus ensuring an exact correspondence between
the homomorphisms of T′-models and the elementary morphisms of T-models.)
Note that “atomisation” (aka “Morleyization”) also appears [54] in another form, as the
addition to a language L of a new relation symbol RA(x) (with appropriate arity) for each
L-formula A(x), together with an axiom ∀x. RA(x)(x) ≡ A(x). This is a different method,
not generally yielding coherent implications, but adequate to yield a theory that, since it
is model-complete, admits quantifier elimination.
12.4. Bezem and Coquand. Bezem and Coquand say that “We give a linear transla-
tion from FOL to CL [i.e. Coherent Logic] that preserves logical equivalence” [6, Abstract].
The paper [6] itself makes the weaker claim that
“We now provide a general way to transform any first-order problem into a coher-
ent problem. More precisely we associate to any first-order formula φ a coherent
theory such that φ is a tautology if and only if the corresponding theory is incon-
sistent. The idea is simply to express the method of analytic tableaux [59]22 as a
coherent theory. In the case of resolution logic the method of tableaux to build
a set of clauses from a formula has been used in [3]. The idea of introducing new
predicates to abbreviate subformulas can be traced further back to Skolem [57],
who proved that every theory has a conservative extension which is equivalent
to a ∀∃-theory.”
The claim in the second sentence of this quotation is weaker than that in the abstract;
nothing is said about preservation of logical equivalence, or about some kind of equivalence
between the formula φ and the theory (such as the latter being a conservative extension
of the (negation of the) former). We could recast the claim as “ψ is satisfiable [iff ¬ψ is
not a tautology] [iff the coherent theory obtained from ¬ψ is consistent] iff the coherent
theory obtained from ¬ψ is satisfiable”, i.e. (modulo a negation symbol) a notion of equi-
satisfiability (not necessarily in the same domain); but that is well-known to be not a
statement about logical equivalence. The focus is on developing ways to see if first-order
formulae are “tautologies” (i.e. theorems) rather than on converting first-order sentences
to coherent theories with the same consequences (in the old language). We show now,
however, that with a very minor addition, it can be recast to achieve the conservativity
result in Theorem 7.7 by a different means.
The method of [6] is to associate two new predicate symbols TB and FB to each sub-
formula B (including atomic subformulae) of the sentence23 A being transformed, and to
express their meanings as SCIs:
22 The citations here are to the papers cited, albeit with different numbers, in [6].
23 Rather than of the entire language, as in [32].
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(i) ∀x.T(B1∧B2)(x)(x)⊃(TB1(x)(x) ∧ TB2(x)(x))
(ii) ∀x.F(B1∧B2)(x)(x)⊃(FB1(x)(x) ∨ FB2(x)(x))
. . .
(ix) ∀x.T∀yC(x,y)(x)⊃TC(x,y)(x, y)
(x) ∀x.F∀yC(x,y)(x)⊃∃yFC(x,y)(x, y)
. . .
(xiii) ∀x.(TP (x)(x) ∧ FP (x)(x))⊃⊥ for atomic P (x)
all universally quantified enough to bind any free variables. We add also the SCIs (xiv)
∀x.TP (x)(x) ⊃ P (x) and (xv) ∀x.(FP (x)(x)∧P (x)) ⊃ ⊥ to give meaning to the new symbols
where P (x) is atomic; this is useful for our purposes, even if not for theirs. With these,
(xiii) is redundant.
Whether this produces more or fewer new predicate symbols than our Skolem-based
method isn’t clear; it depends on the formula’s construction, and the complexity of its
transformation to a quantified disjunctive or conjunctive normal form.
Let G3c−A denote
24 the classical sequent calculus obtained by adding to G3c all these
SCIs (obtained from the sentence A) as inference rules along the lines of [40]. We will use
(in an obvious way) names such as T∧ and F∧ for the rules corresponding to these SCIs.
Proposition 12.4. For every subformula25 B(x) of A, the sequents TB(x)(x) ⇒ B(x)
and FB(x)(x), B(x)⇒ are derivable in G3c−A.
Proof. By induction on the size of the subformula. If B(x) is the atomic formula P (x),
then TB(x)(x) ⇒ P (x) follows by rule TAtom from P (x) ⇒ P (x) and FB(x)(x), P (x) ⇒
follows using the zero-premiss rule FAtom.
If B(x) is a conjunction or a disjunction, the argument is easy. If B(x) is the negation
¬C(x), then we use the induction hypothesis and
FC(x)(x), C(x)⇒
TB(x)(x), C(x)⇒
T¬
TB(x)(x)⇒ ¬C(x) R¬
TC(x)(x)⇒ C(x)
FB(x)(x)⇒ C(x)
F¬
FB(x)(x),¬C(x)⇒ L¬
If B(x) is the formula ∀yC(x, y), we use (with y not free in either example’s conclusion)
the induction hypothesis and
TC(x,y)(x, y)⇒ C(x, y)
TB(x)(x)⇒ C(x, y)
T∀
TB(x)(x)⇒ ∀yC(x, y) R∀
FC(x,y)(x, y), C(x, y)⇒
FC(x,y)(x, y), ∀yC(x, y)⇒ L∀
FB(x)(x),∀yC(x, y)⇒
F∀
All other cases are similar. QED
24 The superfix “minus” is there because we will later augment the calculus with one further rule,
corresponding to the SCI TA (i.e > ⊃ TA), and remove the minus sign.
25 We use B(x) to indicate a subformula with its free variables among those in the tuple x; there is in
general no suggestion that B is a predicate symbol. We use “subformula” in the literal sense rather than
that used to allow a “sub-formula” property to be established, according to which ∀x.x = 0 has, in the
language of arithmetic, not just the subformula x = 0 but also 0 = 0, 1 = 0, 1 + 2 = 0, . . . .
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Corollary 12.5. Let A be a sentence. Then the sequents TA ⇒ A and FA, A ⇒ are
derivable in G3c−A. QED
Corollary 12.6. For every subformula B(x) of A, the sequent TB(x)(x), FB(x)(x)⇒ is
derivable in G3c−A.
Proof. By admissibility [40] of Cut in G3c−A. Alternatively, an inductive proof is straight-
forward. QED
Corollary 12.7. Let A be a sentence. Then the sequents TA ⇒ ¬FA and FA ⇒ ¬TA
are derivable in G3c−A. QED
Without (as axioms or rules) some further SCIs, we don’t have, for example, that
⇒ TA, FA, or ¬FA ⇒ TA, or ¬TA ⇒ FA, are derivable.
Theorem 12.8. Let A be a first-order sentence and Γ,∆ multisets of first-order formu-
lae. Then A,Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3c iff TA,Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3c−A.
Proof. In one direction, by Corollary 12.5 and admissibility of Cut in G3c−A. Conversely,
suppose that TA,Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3c−A. We modify the derivation by replacing
TB(x) by B(x) and FB(x) by ¬B(x) for each sub-formula B(x) of A, care being taken to
use appropriate instantiations of variables. For example, if B(x) is C(x)⊃D(x) and we
have a proof step
FC(x)(x),Γ⇒ ∆ TD(x)(x),Γ⇒ ∆
TB(x)(x),Γ⇒ ∆
T⊃
then we obtain the proof step
¬C(x),Γ⇒ ∆ D(x),Γ⇒ ∆
C(x)⊃D(x),Γ⇒ ∆ L⊃
′
using a derivable variant L⊃′ of the usual L⊃ rule. QED
Let26 G3cA be G3c
−
A plus the rule corresponding to the SCI > ⊃ TA.
Corollary 12.9. Let A be a first-order sentence and Γ,∆ multisets of first-order for-
mulae. Then A,Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3c iff Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in G3cA. QED
Corollary 12.10. Let A be a first-order sentence. Then ⇒ A is derivable in G3cA.
QED
We summarise this by the remark that, although [6] seems to concern satisfiability, it
may, with minor changes, be recast to concern provability. Thus recast, it establishes
anew the theorem that an arbitrary first-order sentence A may be converted to a coherent
conservative extension of the theory axiomatised by {A}—indeed, with a bit more effort,
forms a Skolem extension of that theory. These minor changes are the addition of the SCI
> ⊃ TA to the theory and the replacement of SCIs of type (xiii) by those of type (xiv) and
(xv), which give meaning to the new predicate symbols in terms of atoms in A.
26 The notation has already been used above for the calculus G3c obtained by adding rules obtained
by our own method; the systems are equivalent.
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12.5. Fisher and Bezem. In 2009 Fisher and Bezem [21] gave, as an example, the
actions of a “Skolem machine” showing that the formula ∃xR(x) ∨ ∃xyS(x, y) is a conse-
quence of the coherent theory [21, Fig. 1] axiomatised by ∃x.D(x) ∧ P (x), ∀x.D(x)⊃U(x),
∀x. P (x)⊃(Q(x) ∨R(x) ∨ ∃y(D(y) ∧ S(x, y))) and ∀x. (U(x) ∧Q(x))⊃⊥. ([21] expresses
these sentences in a Prolog-like notation, with upper case for variables and lower case
for predicate symbols.) They note that the computation shows that ∃x(U(x) ∧ Q(x)) ∨
∃xR(x) ∨ ∃xyS(x, y) is a logical consequence of the theory axiomatised by the first three
of these axioms; it is, and it does, but our explanation seems to match better the different
uses of “goal” and “false” in [21]. Whichever point of view one takes, prior conversion of
formulae (including the negation of the goal formula) into SCIs (such as the conjunction
of ∀x.R(x)⊃⊥ and ∀xy. S(x, y)⊃⊥) by the method of [6] is (in general) required; in other
words, proof of a formula by showing its negation to lead to a contradiction. A Prolog
program is given for converting SCIs into instructions for a “Skolem Abstract Machine”,
akin to the Warren Abstract Machine used by Prolog implementations.
However, in 2012, Fisher [22] describes “deterministic translation schemas for FOL” that
work rather differently, preserving inputs that are already of the right form and avoiding
the use of proof by contradiction. This unpublished work seems to be promising but not
yet in final form, so we comment on it no further.
12.6. Polonsky. Polonsky’s thesis [51] starts from the negation normal forms (NNFs)
of axioms and conjectures and their contrapositives; it presents valuable refinements of the
work of [6], but without any suggestion of a conservative extension result. As noted in [5],
it includes “a complete description of a translation from FOL to CL, accompanied by a
working implementation and experimental results”.
12.7. Mints. In 2012 Mints [39] has different results, with as aim the reduction of the
complexity of the algorithm implicit in the proof of the first-order form of Barr’s theorem
(including dealing with cuts). In his Section 2 (“Reducing Formula Depth”), he uses a
methodology similar to that of [6] of generating a new predicate symbol PF for each non-
atomic subformula F of the original formula. (If the subformula is atomic, then it will
stand for itself.)
§13. Generalised geometric implications. Negri [42] introduced a class GGI of
first-order sentences, defined recursively as follows: GA0 is the class of special coherent
implications ∀x.H0 ⊃ ∃H1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃Hm, and, for n ≥ 0, GAn+1 is the class of sentences
∀x.H ⊃ (∃y1G1∨· · ·∨∃ymGm), where each Hi is a (possibly empty) conjunction of atoms,
m ≥ 0 and each Gi is an instance (with free variables in x,yi) of a sentence from GAk for
k ≤ n. With m = 0, the succedent of the implication is just ⊥; likewise, sentences where
H0 is the empty conjunction > are identified with sentences from which the implication
symbol and its trivial antecedent are omitted. Sentences from GAn are implicitly also
sentences of GAn+1. GGI is then the union of the classes GAn : n ≥ 0. The subformulae
Gi will be called GGI-subformulae.
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It then follows [42] that (i) a sentence in GGI has no negative occurrences of implication27
or universal quantification; (ii), conversely, a sentence with this property (called “weakly
positive” in Section 17) is intuitionistically equivalent to a conjunction of sentences in
GGI; and if a single-succedent sequent’s antecedent formulae are in GGI and the succedent
formula is a coherent implication, then any classical proof of the sequent can be transformed
to an intuitionistic proof—a generalisation of the first-order version of Barr’s theorem, and
in the spirit of Orekvov’s work [48] on Glivenko classes.
In [42] “systems of rules” for the class GGI are introduced. Such systems of rules do
not require an extension of the language to obtain an equivalent theory; rather than by
the addition of new predicate symbols, alternations of quantifiers are coded up through a
prescribed order in which the added rules and their eigenvariables may occur in a derivation;
they are thus expressible in the unextended language, but require extra book-keeping of
the variable dependencies. By the method above, they can be translated to ordinary rules,
the order of which is implicitly imposed by the occurrences of the new predicate symbols,
as illustrated in Section 7.
Theorem 13.1. Let A be a sentence in GGI. Then the theory TA defined by atomising
the occurrences of GGI-subformulae of A is a coherent Skolem extension of the theory
{A}.
Proof. Routine. Note that the atomisation of A itself is a new atom and in TA. QED
The translation of A into SCIs and then into rules is thus (on the class GGI) equivalent
to the method of extension by systems of rules, but has the advantage of making the
variable dependencies explicit, with consequent benefits for automation.
§14. Application to labelled sequent calculi. Our interest in this issue arose from
the apparent necessity to have frame conditions for modal or intermediate logics be SCIs
(rather than arbitrary first-order formulae [11] or ∀∃ formulae [13]) if the “labelled sequent
calculi” methodology of [17, 41] was to be applicable. (For a concise presentation of the
methodology see Chapters 11 and 12 of [45].) Having, for a given theory about one or
more accessibility relations, found a coherent conservative extension of the theory, one
must check that it does exactly what is required: a labelled modal28 formula is provable
using the old theory iff provable in the extended theory (and similarly for formulae from
intermediate logics).
One can achieve the result by proving completeness with respect to Kripke semantics for
the extended labelled calculus, as in [43]. The rules for relational atoms are clearly sound
in the class of frames identified by the extension and, by conservativity, they are sound
in the class of frames axiomatised by A. As for completeness, we have to prove that the
countermodel obtained by the failed proof search procedure is indeed in the intended class
of frames. Because of saturation with respect to the frame rules, the countermodel satisfies
27 Implicitly, this also forbids negative occurrences of negation, since ¬A is just an abbreviation for
A ⊃ ⊥.
28 In the sense of “formula of modal logic” rather than “formula preceded by a modal operator”.
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by construction the properties given by the coherent semi-definitional extension associated
to A. By suitable substitutions (or alternatively, by the derivation of A using the rules
that correspond to the SCIs, as in section 10), it is then seen to satisfy A.
§15. Other approaches to frame condition usage. To illustrate the importance of
coherentisation, in this section we consider two other approaches [11, 13] to the problem
solved by the use of coherent conservative extensions—the exploitation of frame conditions
in modal and intermediate logics. For brevity we focus on modal logics.
15.1. Castellini and Smaill. Castellini and Smaill [11] showed how arbitrary first-
order frame conditions can be converted, via clausal form with Skolem function symbols,
to rules for use in labelled sequent calculus for first-order modal logics; their systems,
however, are not analytic: arbitrarily complex new terms may need to be introduced in
root-first proof search. There are two forms of non-analyticity. First: in contrast to Negri’s
approach in [41], the L2 and R3 rules [11, Table 2, page 577] are not triggered (when there
is a labelled antecedent formula 0 : 2A) by an antecedent formula 0 ≺ τ (allowing τ : A
to be added to the antecedent) but by a proof, in a separate subgoal, of the formula 0 ≺ τ
for some as yet unknown term τ . Second: this on its own is relatively harmless, but the
presence of Skolem function symbols means that the number of possible terms τ is infinite.
Similar remarks apply to rules [11, Table 4, p 583] generated from frame conditions.
For example, let f be a fresh Skolem function symbol29. The frame condition
∀x∃y. x ≺ y ∧ ∀z. y ≺ z ⊃ y = z
generates the rule30
Γ, τ1 ≺ f(τ1), f(τ1) = τ2 ⇒ ∆ Γ, τ1 ≺ f(τ1) ⇒ f(τ1) ≺ τ2,∆
Γ⇒ ∆ atom
In the proof [11, Fig. 7, page 586]31 of the McKinsey sequent 0 : 23A ⇒ 0 : 32A,
considered root-first, the rule R3 is activated not by an antecedent formula 0 ≺ y (which
might have been provided already by the just-mentioned frame condition) but by the
possibility, to be justified in a new branch, of finding some term τ (which is in fact f(0))
for which 0 ≺ τ can be proved. See Section 11 above for our own approach, in which that
frame condition (using R in place of ≺) is converted to the special coherent implications
∀x.> ⊃ ∃y. xRy ∧My and ∀xy. (Mx ∧ xRy) ⊃ x = y and thus to the two rules (with y
fresh in the first)
xRy,My,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ γ
Mx, xRy, x = y,Γ⇒ ∆
Mx, xRy,Γ⇒ ∆ δ
The rule γ corresponding to the first of these SCIs has xRy and My in the premiss but
not in the conclusion; but its use is triggered only by an instance of x in the conclusion
29 “f” stands here for “final”. The symbol “la” is used in [11].
30 Note that the rule is not so transparently related to the frame condition as in cases following our
own methodology.
31 The proof contains a typographic error: the second occurrence of la(0) = t1 should be la(0) = t2.
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and the number of possible new formulae of this kind is finite, whereas presence of the
Skolem function symbol f allows arbitrarily many instantiations f(x), f(f(x)), . . . . See
[17, Section 8] for our own treatment of analyticity issues.
15.2. Ciabattoni et al. Ciabattoni et al. [13] show how all ∀∃-formulas (i.e. those in
the class Π2 comprising universal closures of existential closures of quantifier-free formulae)
can be converted to rules by approximately the same method as that developed by Negri
in [40] for SCIs, the main variation being that, like [11], the right-hand sides of sequents
can be used for the components of the new rules. Their paper poses various questions,
such as “What is the maximum nesting of quantifiers occurring in formulas defining frame
conditions for intermediate logics?”. This question remains interesting, but its importance
is diminished by the realisation that, however much quantifier nesting there is, the formula
can be converted (without rules using the right-hand sides of sequents) to a system of
instances of the rule scheme of [40]—or, without mentioning rules, to a system of SCIs
with equal deductive power so far as formulae in the original language are concerned.
§16. Worked examples. In this section (which may be skipped by the smart reader)
we illustrate the use of some of the methodologies studied above. We use as an example
a formula discussed above in Section 7, namely A ≡ ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx, i.e. the formula
A = ∀xB(x), where B(x) = ∃yC(x, y), where C(x, y) = D(x, y)∧E(x, y), where D(x, y) =
xRy and E(x, y) = ¬D(y, x).
16.1. Skolem’s method, extended. The formula is already in prenex normal form,
and its body is in both CNF and DNF. Using the methodology of Section 7, we add the new
binary predicate symbolN (with infix notation) and the new axiom ∀xy. (xNy ∧ yRx) ⊃ ⊥.
The old axiom A is replaced by the axiom ∀x.> ⊃ ∃y. xRy ∧ xNy. Here then is an 8-step
proof of ⇒A using the associated schematic rules R1 and R2:
xRy, xNy ⇒ xRy Id
xRy, xNy, yRx⇒ R1
xRy, xNy ⇒ ¬yRx R¬
xRy, xNy ⇒ xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∧
xRy ∧ xNy ⇒ xRy ∧ ¬yRx L∧
xRy ∧ xNy ⇒ ∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∃
⇒ ∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx R2
⇒ A R∀
16.2. Antonius’ method. Applying Antonius’ technique we get32 that A is N1, that
∃x.¬B(x) is ∃x.¬B(x), that ¬B(x) is N2(x), that B(x) is ∃yC(x, y), and that C(x, y) is
xRy ∧N3(x, y), with the additional six axioms:
1. > ⊃ (N1 ∨ ∃x¬B(x))
2. (N1 ∧ ∃x¬B(x)) ⊃ ⊥
3. ∀x.> ⊃ (N2(x) ∨B(x))
4. ∀x. (N2(x) ∧B(x)) ⊃ ⊥
32 For brevity we use N1 rather than N∃x¬B(x), N2 rather than NB(x) and N3 rather than NyRx.
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5. ∀xy.> ⊃ (N3(x, y) ∨ yRx)
6. ∀xy. (N3(x, y) ∧ yRx) ⊃ ⊥.
which can be rewritten as the SCIs
1. > ⊃ (N1 ∨ ∃xN2(x))
2. ∀x. (N1 ∧N2(x)) ⊃ ⊥
3. ∀x.> ⊃ (N2(x) ∨ ∃y. xRy ∧N3(x, y))
4. ∀xy. (N2(x) ∧ xRy ∧N3(x, y)) ⊃ ⊥
5. ∀xy.> ⊃ (N3(x, y) ∨ yRx)
6. ∀xy. (N3(x, y) ∧ yRx) ⊃ ⊥.
So, T is N1 (i.e. > ⊃ N1) with these last 6 axioms.
Here then is a 9-step proof of ⇒A in T, using the schematic rules R0 generated from
> ⊃ N1 and R1, . . . , R6 from these additional 6 axioms:
N2(x), N1 ⇒ ∃y.xRy ∧ ¬yRx R2
xRy, . . .⇒ xRy Id
yRx, xRy,N3(x, y), N1 ⇒ R6
xRy,N3(x, y), N1 ⇒ ¬yRx R¬
xRy,N3(x, y), N1 ⇒ xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∧
xRy,N3(x, y), N1 ⇒ ∃y.xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∃
N1 ⇒ ∃y.xRy ∧ ¬yRx R3
N1 ⇒ ∀x∃y.xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∀
⇒ ∀x∃y.xRy ∧ ¬yRx R0 .
Note that we use R2, R3 and R6 but not R1, R4 or R5, because the sub-formula ∃x¬B(x)
occurs just negatively in A, the sub-formula B(x) occurs just positively in A and the sub-
formula yRx occurs just negatively in A. In other words, on this formula, it is sufficient to
generate just 4 SCIs: R0, R2, R3 and R6.
16.3. Johnstone’s method. Given that this method adds a pair of SCIs for each
formula of the language, we omit details for lack of space. Roughly the same idea, but
more limited, appears in our next subsection.
16.4. Bezem & Coquand’s method. Using the same example, we generate a set of
seven33 SCIs, as follows:34
(i). > ⊃ TA
(ii). ∀x. TA⊃TB(x)(x)
(iii). ∀x. TB(x)(x)⊃∃yTC(x,y)(x, y)
(iv). ∀xy. TC(x,y)(x, y)⊃(TD(x,y)(x, y) ∧ TE(x,y)(x, y))
(v). ∀xy. TD(x,y)(x, y)⊃ xRy
(vi). ∀xy. TE(x,y)(x, y)⊃FD(x,y)(y, x)
(vii). ∀xy. (FD(x,y)(x, y) ∧ xRy)⊃ ⊥.
A 12-step proof of the sequent ⇒ A in the calculus G3cA is as follows:
33 Reduced from thirteen by considering the polarities of subformula occurrences, as suggested in [6].
34 We sidestep some obvious typographic errors at the relevant points in [6].
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xRy, . . .⇒ xRy Id
TD(x,y)(x, y), . . .⇒ xRy
(v)
. . . , FD(x,y)(y, x), yRx⇒
(vii)
. . . , FD(x,y)(y, x)⇒ ¬yRx R¬
. . . , TE(x,y)(x, y)⇒ ¬yRx
(vi)
. . . , TD(x,y)(x, y), TE(x,y)(x, y)⇒ xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∧
TC(x,y)(x, y)⇒ xRy ∧ ¬yRx
(iv)
TC(x,y)(x, y)⇒ ∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∃
TB(x)(x)⇒ ∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx
(iii)
TA ⇒ ∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx (ii)
TA ⇒ ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx R∀
⇒ ∀x∃y. xRy ∧ ¬yRx (i)
which may be compared and contrasted with the 8-step proof given in Subsection 16.1
and the 9-step proof given in Subsection 16.2. Note that the instantiation of the bound
variables x, y of rule (vii) by y, x affects the arguments of the new predicate symbol FD(x,y)
but not its name, i.e. we don’t need to consider FD(y,x).
§17. A new coherentisation algorithm. As should now be clear, coherentisation
may easily destroy the axiom’s structure, especially if it begins with conversion to CNF
(Section 8), DNF (Subsection 7.2) or NNF (Subsection 12.6); the ideal approach is to avoid
doing so, and to leave axioms that are already SCIs unchanged (and those, like (19), that are
nearly so, almost unchanged). Finding general methods of performing such coherentisation
is a research problem, with some recent work on related matters described in [21, 22, 51].
To this end, we outline a new algorithm, details of which will appear elsewhere [18].
Definition 17.1 (Weakly positive formula). A formula is weakly positive iff all oc-
currences of ∀,⊃ and ¬ are positive occurrences.
This is a generalisation both of “positive” (no occurrences of those connectives) and of
“negation normal” (no implications, and all occurrences of other connectives are positive).
Such formulae appear, unnamed, in [42, Thm 3.2]. In other words, ∀ is allowed in positive
positions, and implications (and negations) are allowed provided their antecedents are
positive formulae.
A simple transformation shows that every formula is classically equivalent to a weakly
positive formula. This can be achieved by conversion to negation normal form, but
that destroys rather a lot of the structure of the formula; our aim here is to change
much less. We treat negated formulae as implications. We exploit just the following
two classical equivalences: (C ⊃ D) ⊃ B ≡ (C ∧ ¬D) ∨B, ∀xA ⊃ B ≡ ∃x.A ⊃ B (if x is
not free in B), and the three intuitionistic equivalences (C∨D)⊃B ≡ (C⊃B) ∧ (D ⊃ B),
(C ∧D) ⊃ B ≡ C ⊃ (D⊃B) and ∃xA ⊃ B ≡ ∀x.A⊃B (if x is not free in B). (The last
three may be familiar from [15].) Simplification, e.g. conversion of A ∧> to A, is allowed.
By these means, the antecedent of any implication can be reduced to a positive formula,
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since it is either an implication, universally quantified, or (allowing recursive access to its
components) a disjunction, a conjunction, existentially quantified or (with no components)
an atom. If it is already positive, no transformation is applied. As derived equivalences we
can use ¬¬A ≡ A and ¬A ⊃ B ≡ A ∨B.
Now, every weakly positive formula A can, by recursive decomposition, be converted to a
finite set of coherent implications conservative over A. We are looking for a sequence (as one
progresses leafwards from the root of the parse tree of A) of universal quantifications, then
(ignoring, because they are positive, their antecedents) implications, then disjunctions, then
existential quantifiers, then conjunctions, then either atoms or universal quantifications,
and (in the non-atom case) so on. (The situation is complicated by occasional gaps.) As
soon as one reaches a formula that one would like to be an atom but is not, a fresh atom
is created (and used) and a universally quantified implication is created (with the atom as
antecedent and, for further analysis, a complex succedent). Eventually this terminates.
Better still, one can often do in advance some (intuitionistically correct) permutations to
reduce the number of times one has to go round this loop: e.g., distribution of existential
quantifiers or conjunctions into disjunctions. A full list of what is currently used is
exists x. A v B ==> exists x A v exists x B
A & (B v C) ==> (A & B) v (A & C)
(B v C) & A ==> (B & A) v (C & A)
C & exists x D ==> exists x. C & D (x chosen not free in C)
(exists x C) & D ==> exists x. C & D (x chosen not free in D)
A => forall x B ==> forall x. A => B (x chosen not free in A)
A => B => C ==> A & B => C
~A ==> A => \bot
Finally, the argument of Proposition 2.6 replaces coherent implications by lists of special
coherent implications.
This sequence of transformations leaves formulae such as (19) unchanged, and seems
promising as a method of coherentisation without much destruction of formula structure.
Tseitin variables (see [25, § 2.8] for examples and references), to reduce the explosive
(potentially exponential) effects of distribution of conjunctions into disjunctions, can be
added without difficulty. (This is yet another technique like that of Skolem [57, Thm 1].)
Theorem 17.2. This algorithm, applied to an SCI, returns the SCI unchanged (apart
from simplifications such as conversion of A ∧ > to A).
Proof. By definition, an SCI contains no negations; they are all expressed using implication
and ⊥. In an SCI, the antecedent of every implication is a conjunction of atoms, and thus
positive, so the first transformation is not applied. Moreover, the list of permutations
allowed in the second phase contains none that has an LHS that occurs in an SCI; so none
of these can be applied. QED
§18. Implementation. We have implementations in Objective Caml [47] of most of the
algorithms presented above, notably the two based on Skolem’s approach, that based on
Antonius’ method, and our new algorithm, including algorithms representing the proofs of
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Propositions 2.3 and 2.6. The implementations, exploiting the superb implementation of
first-order logic by Harrison [25], can be found at [19].
§19. Discussion. As observed by a referee, “all existing provers for coherent logic deal
only with coherent formulae and do not support transformation of arbitrary input formu-
lae. The only such system is by Polonsky [51]”—but, we would mention also the work of
Fisher [22]. Much more effort has gone into the automation of coherent logic, in the sense
of starting from (wlog special) coherent implications and seeing whether the particular
formula ⊥ can be deduced. However, it is not our intention in this paper to survey the
latter field: our own interest is in a hybrid system where some axioms, being SCIs, can be
used as rules for proving arbitrary formulae: for example, given some frame conditions for
a modal logic, can one prove such-and-such a modal formula?
A few provisional remarks, however, that contrast the different coherentisation algorithms
can be made. The CNF-based version looked promising, but the DNF-based version deals
better with formulae that are already SCIs, or nearly so. For example, the KP condition
of Section 11, which can be handled using two SCIs and just one new name, is converted by
the CNF-based algorithm to seven new SCIs (with six new names) and by the DNF-based
algorithm to just three SCIs (with two new names). Both produce (in our limited range
of tests) no more SCIs than the method of Antonius, which in turn (and in the absence
of refinements and optimisations) seems to be more economical than the tableau-inspired
system of [6]. The algorithm outlined in Section 17 seems to be even better, at least for
converting axioms into axioms. (The conversion of a complex goal formula’s negation into
a short list of SCIs is more challenging.)
§20. Conclusion and final remarks. Our work on this topic began with the task
of meeting a challenge about the technique used for KP in [17], and the example from
Ciabattoni in Section 10. The challenge has been met, and the technique placed in the
context of results by Skolem in 1920, by Antonius in 1975 and those in more recent papers
that appear (at first glance) to do something more limited (Bezem et al) or different (Mints).
Behind all this is the 1970s work in categorical logic, of which parts are explicated here in
non-categorical terms. That every first-order theory can be “conservatively extended”35
to a coherent theory has its uses, as illustrated by our replacement of a non-coherent
axiomatisation of KP by a coherent one[17]), even where one does not strive to model all
the reasoning in coherent logic.
We observe that the interaction used in [41] and [17] between a background coherent first-
order theory (about an accessibility relation) and a propositional or first-order theory (of
modal logic or intermediate logic, respectively) does not easily allow the solution of negating
the goal formula, making it into a coherent theory and seeking to prove a contradiction; if
it did, then the techniques of [6] would suffice. It is for this reason that we have spelt out
some more general results in detail.
35 Reyes’ term [53] for Antonius’ idea was “rendered”, as in “every classical theory may be rendered
coherent by extending the language”. We are careful to avoid this ambiguous term, because of the issues
discussed in Section 9 above.
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Despite some examples above showing that our methods (starting from our refinement of
Skolem’s algorithm for something different) for coherentising a theory produce (in general)
fewer SCIs than the tableau-based method of generating one or two new predicate symbols
for every subformula, we are open-minded about which method is best; combination of
ideas and optimisations are required.
§21. Acknowledgments. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting im-
provements, to Andrew Polonsky for a copy of his thesis [51], to Wedad Antonius for
permission to quote from her thesis [1], to Philip Scott for bringing his copy thereof from
Canada to Scotland and allowing us the loan of it, to Marc Bezem and Peter Johnstone for
helpful comments on a draft and to Michael Rathjen for a copy of his unpublished lecture
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